The competition among enterprises has gradually become the competition between supply chains, and it is more and more important for the cooperation among members of the supply chain to improve supply chain performance. Information sharing is an important way of cooperation among members of supply chain, which attaches great significance for the integration of the supply chain.
Introduction
The interests of all members of the supply chain are relatively independent, and thus likely to cause delays and distortions in the information of supply chain, such as the existence of the bullwhip effect of supply chain [1] [19] . Studies have shown that members' own making decisions may not be able to achieve supply chain optimization. To achieve supply chain optimization, supply chain members must enhance cooperation for information sharing. Scholars have discussed from different perspectives that share information can bring overall benefits to supply chain's growth. Hau L. Lee, Kut C. So and Christopher S. Tang (2000) studied the value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain and suggested that the value of demand information sharing can be quite high, especially when demands are significantly correlated over time [2] . Yang Haiwei and Dong Anbang discussed the importance of the information integration technologies to information sharing in supply chain [3] . A. Gunasekarana and E. W. T. Ngai (2004) discussed the application of information technology in supply chain integration and management [4] . Wang Wei and et al (2005) analyzed the classification of information shared in supply chain and discussed the realization approaches including information system platform [5] . G. Prem Premkumar (2000) provided an integrated perspective of supply chain management and inter-organizational systems (IOS) that highlight the potential benefits, and management issues and provides guidelines for implementation [6] . In order to compare the co-operative supply chain with non-cooperative supply chain,Weihua Xu and etc al(2010) present an EPQ model for the co-operative supply chain under the conditions of permissible delay in payments [17] . Yiqun Li and et al(2011) pointed out that the platform of electronic commerce information services has become a key factor in the international trade information management in China [18] .According to the existing literature and the application practice of information technology, we can infer that members of supply chain more and more rely on various management information systems to implement their supply chain Information Sharing among Members of the Supply Chain from the Perspective of Game Zhengmin Liu, Gaoshan Wang, Peide Liu Advances on Information Sciences and Service Sciences. Volume 3, Number 2, March 2011 management strategy, and therefore their practice of information sharing will also be integrated with information technology. So information systems and information sharing play key role in supply chain management. The supply chain members should integrate their information systems development and information sharing strategies together. However, the members of a supply chain are independent entities who have their own interests. To analyze their behavior, game theoretic analysis is introduced into information sharing in supply chain management. Gérard P. Cachon and Martin A. Lariviere (2001) designed incentive contracts to promote the sharing of demand prediction information [7] . Zhang Cuihua (2006) proposed a collaboration mechanism, which includes order quantity, punishment cost and bonus, under supplying capacity uncertainty [8] . Most existing literatures use game theory to analyze the information sharing level and asymmetric information in supply chain. In order to gain an insight into the problem, this paper would like to explore the cooperation of supply chain members in information sharing via establishing inter-organizational information systems.
Information sharing and inter-organizational information systems
An important way of information sharing among supply chain members is Inter-organizational Information Systems. The adoption of IOS, will effectively remove information asymmetry of supply chain, achieve the supply chain information integration among enterprises, thus effectively harmonize the corporate behavior, integrate the management, create new values and realize the supply chain optimization.
Inter-organizational information systems are generally defined as follows: inter-organizational information systems is information system based upon computer and communication technology, to achieve inter-organizational information flow, conduct integration management on information in and out of enterprises, and is shared by organizations [9] .
IOS is based on computer and communications technology to automatically handle a variety of business information, which is different from the distributed information systems inside the organization. It allows transfer of information across organizational boundaries. Such establishment of information systems across organizational boundaries means that cooperation and coordination between organizations has been far beyond the traditional definition. Supply chain management based on IOS provides the conditions for cooperation and alliances among various organizations, and it is conducive to both partners to reduce the "bullwhip effect" through effective information sharing, thereby reducing supply chain uncertainty [10] .
As the inter-organizational information systems come across organizational boundaries, the coordination and Game between organizations runs a major impact on the inter-organizational information system.
Game analysis of supply chain using IOS

Factors affecting the implementation of IOS
In the process that supply chain is lead into IOS, every business needs to consider how significant the benefit IOS could provide will be, what kind of loss it will result in, how much the cost of investment in IOS will be, who will invest, which kind of information can be shared? Many factors affect the implementation of IOS, which can learn from Tornatzky's analysis.
Tornatzky et al (1990) analyzed factors of corporation's adoption and expansion of innovation and technology from three levels: technology, organization, environments. Technology level describes the relevant science and technology of internal and external enterprises, including existing technology within the enterprise, the technology available on the market. Organizational level refers to the size and scope of the enterprise, centralization, formalization, the complexity of the management structure, quality of human resources and available internal resources. Environmental level is the corporation's industrial conditions, competitors, suppliers, customers and government.
In fact, the use of IOS is the result of the convergence of these three factors. In general, the direct drive for applying IOS is caused by the strong stimulation from the internal (organizational level) and the external (environmental level), mainly: the pressure from the partners, competition, the internal's demand for efficiency gains [11] . Different motivations make various enterprises of play different roles. The enterprises which are about to gain the best interests will play a driving role, assume responsibility for organization, implementation and supervision, while other companies are playing the role of respondents. For the enterprises promoting IOS project, the main motivation is out of long-term strategic planning, usually from the strong stimulation of the external competitive environment. In order to maintain the competitive edge, the enterprises require to change organizational structure and to improve organizational efficiency, and then generate the will to implement IOS [12] . In general, the implementation of IOS has a value on every business, so for each participant, it is necessary to promote the implementation of IOS. However, the distribution of benefits is not equal. If a participant refused or hesitated to join, enterprise benefiting most will promote these enterprises to join.
The decision-making difficulties for the implementation of IOS
It is generally believed that the establishment of IOS among upstream and downstream enterprises of supply chain will bring win-win situation for businesses. For example, in the manufacturer -sales channel business model, through the IOS information sharing, sales channels business could achieve lower purchasing costs and faster order response time, manufacturers can get timely and effective market demand information provided by vendors to arrange the production and marketing. However, in the process of the introduction of IOS by both partners in the supply chain, on the one hand, enterprises need to rely on each other's information in coordination and operation, the other hand, in order to against losses, enterprises are often reluctant to tell their own information to partners (such as hiding information for increasing its own chips during negotiations with the other party, etc.), resulting in information asymmetry between the partners and adverse selection problems [13] . In IOS applications, therefore, there are problems for the re-balance of relationship and interests between partnerships inevitably.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that implementation of IOS will bring potential benefits. Of course, deciding to build such a system is also exposed to the risks and has to bear the corresponding costs. In fact, when the information reaches a certain level, people will find that communication and cooperation, for example, connected to both systems, can bring convenience to both sides, such as automatic replenishment between suppliers and retailers. At the very beginning when the supplier said to the retailers that I can help you manage your inventory, the retailer may grudge, but after ideas have changed, the bilateral cooperation would not be blocked.
Game Analysis of the implementation of IOS
3.3.1. Retailer-supplier static game of complete information:Suppose a retailer and a supplier, for the requirement of the internal to promote efficiency, developed their information systems. After cooperation, they will get revenue T ,
T is the revenue of retailers and suppliers, respectively, after application of IOS, it is subject to the organizational level and environmental factors, and may appear to be a kind of strategic leadership, but also may be manifested as a long-term competitive advantage or newly created value, which by may not be recognized by the manager for the limitations of cognitive ability. The two sides of supply chain will also pay a technology costs t C ,
C and t2 C is respectively cost paid by retailers and suppliers on technology. In addition, the two sides will exchange information, sense of their own potential loss subject to certain aspects, respectively, s1
C and s2 C . t1 C , t2 C , s1 C and s2 C depends on the depth of information exchange  (indicated with a number between 0 and 100), and the larger  may lead to higher levels of cooperation, greater C and
. Suppose they both have two strategic options: "to establish IOS" and "not to establish IOS" and take action simultaneously, and the strategies and payoffs of both players are common knowledge, then the game between both sides is a static game of complete information [14, 15] , which can be expressed as the matrix shown in Table 1 
 denote the payoff of the retailer and the supplier respectively, then . Thus, equation (1) and (2) becomes as follows
Let equation (3) and (4)  0 and (not to establish, not to establish) is Nash equilibrium. This means that if both the retailer and the supplier believe that the IOS cannot bring them an information sharing level which is higher than 39 they will not establish the IOS. Otherwise, if a kind of IOS can make the level of information sharing between them more than 158, they will implement the system.  , 2   0, and (establish, establish) to be balanced.
Retailer-supplier static game of incomplete information:
The above analysis is built on the basis of assuming the payoffs of both players are common knowledge, but this assumption of common knowledge is not fully in line with objective facts. 1  and 2  are often affected by various factors. If the information technology level is unchanged, retailers and suppliers are likely to be limited by social development, competition and cognitive abilities, and thus T and s C presents some uncertainty.
,  is the exogenous random variable, subject to the probability density of ) ( f , then the expected return of the members of the supply chain for information sharing is:
Suppose that the supplier and the retailer move simultaneously, but the supplier only knows the probability density of the payoff of the retailer, i.e. he knows what is the probability (indicated by  )
. Then he chooses "to establish" or not depends on whether
is larger than zero or not. Similarly if the retailer only knows the probability density of the payoff of the supplier, he will choose his strategy according to the same considerations. At this point, (to establish, not to establish) as a Nash equilibrium depends on . This also shows that the implementation of IOS depends on the accordance with recognition and facts of members of supply chain affected by factors such as science and technology, organizations, environments.
3.3.3.
The retailer-supplier dynamic game of complete information :Now, assume that the retailer moves first and the supplier follows him. The retailer has two choices: "to establish" and "not to establish", after the retailer makes a decision the supplier observes the decision and then makes his own decision. Or conversely the supplier moves first and the retailer follows him. They all know their payoffs each other. The game is shown in Figure 2 .
When judgments are consistent in basic value and 0 , 2 1    , (to establish, to establish) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Under this condition, either party has a desire to act first, to promote (to establish, to establish) into a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Both players have a first edge, i.e. either has the ability to make commitments or choose an irrevocable strategy (to establish in this case) and then to make a notice to the other. Now, there is no need to tell whether 1  or 2  is bigger or smaller. Therefore, it is an ideal situation, both sides recognized that 0 , , even if only one player recognized this, (to establish, to establish) will be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, for the one who recognized this will actively promote and convince the other to practice IOS jointly, regardless of    , i.e. no matter their own benefit is larger or smaller than the other. In other words, as long as both parties could benefit, he will actively promote when he recognized that the implementation of IOS is beneficial to both sides while the other did not recognize, even if his benefit is smaller, rather than to promote by the one who benefits most. , (to establish, to establish) can then be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, shown in Figure 3 . At this time, leading enterprises have the ability to create more value by the supply chain based on integrating the supply chain. He will assume the role of leadership for obtaining optimization of the whole supply chain, as well as higher utility than his past, and, make the appropriate commitment, offer favorable conditions to other members of the supply chain, lead the entire supply chain into a higher level. Today's competition is competition between supply chain and supply chain, which has recognized by many outstanding leading businesses and take steps to improve their knowledge sharing level in supply chain. For example, in 2003, the Midea (an air-conditioning Co.) began to install Finance Invoicing software for its dealers, to conduct the implementation of vendor managed inventory (VMI) supply chain model.
CONCLUSIONS
The effectiveness 1  , 2  of information sharing and implementation of IOS by members of supply chain is affected integrated by factors such as expected revenue, technical costs and the loss of certain privileges caused by disclosing information. With the continued convergence of technological, organizational and environmental factors as well as the raising of the understanding and practice levels, when the two sides found extensive co-operation can bring high returns, the establishment and implementation of IOS is very easy, and IOS will also continue to deepen. IOS is actually developing from junior to senior level, undergoing phases from paper, EDI, systems integration and strategic partners (Shore, 2001) [16] . Therefore, the implementation of IOS, the most powerful impetus comes from the great development potential brought by co-operation will (revenue), when ways and means bringing new value to supply chain based on information sharing (such as the joint forecast by both sides) were constantly found, and were recognized and applied by members, implementation and progress of IOS is an inevitable result. Therefore, it is necessary for the implementation of the IOS to improve the ability of businesses to create value cooperatively, once a number of outstanding companies can prove it, the other companies will follow suit and eventually realize the implementation of IOS.
